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In this dissertation, the aim was to describe and explain differences among Dutch municipalities in their execution of innovative decentralized policies. We wanted to examine the validity of the decentralization-thesis - that in the development of local policies, local governments are responsive to local priorities, and to local needs and demands of their citizens. The alternative hypothesis concerns an absence of local responsiveness and local customization of policies, because municipalities are not able to innovate according to their motivations due to existing obstacles and a lack of resources. Differences in innovativeness can become visible either through differences in timing of adoption of the innovation, or through differences in the content of the innovation. We examined administrative and political innovations that were either mandated or voluntary. In four empirical chapters we tested hypotheses about the effects of municipalities' motivations, obstacles and resources on innovation. We have shown that the speed by which innovations were adopted, and the extent of innovation in content both seem to be mostly dictated by resources (Chapters 1-2 and 4), and incidentally also by motivations such as local needs, demands, and ideology (Chapter 3). Furthermore, obstacles were only of limited importance (Chapter 4-5). Besides the influence of local motivations, obstacles, and resources, factors external to municipalities were also influential. Horizontally, other governments in the same regional policy network were important for municipalities' individual innovation behavior (Chapter 2-3); professional networks however had no effect on innovation (Chapters 3-5). Vertically, a national organization, the Dutch Association of Municipalities (VNG), influenced innovation (Chapter 5). At last, municipalities' policy innovations were also influenced by the national government (Chapter 2-3). Our conclusion is that the influence of obstacles is negligible, that motivations were only marginally responsible for differences in innovativeness, and that resources could foremost account for differences in innovativeness among Dutch municipalities.

Argues that a nation's well-being mirrors the health of its citizens. This book outlines the strategies that emphasize a balance between public and individual health goals, and collaborations between cost-efficient, streamlined medical care and therapeutic research and technology - values that have been traditionally been considered in conflict

This paper generates new hypotheses for research on policy innovations. Some of these hypotheses explore the extent and speed of the diffusion of innovations across states. Others consider the circumstances and conditions when later adopters either expand the scope of innovations or reinvent the policy of leaders. The focus here is on the attributes of innovations rather than the characteristics of adopters. The goal is to encourage studies that compare diffusion patterns among policies as well as among states.

It is argued that fragmented & decentralized policy-making structures can generate major policy innovation as well as can centralized structures. The fragmented committee structure of the US Congress is shown to facilitate innovation in the example of federal water pollution control legislation. Thorough consideration of four dimensions of costs & benefits strengthens the case for disjointed innovation, since it "promotes entrepreneurship, encourages competition, minimizes the costs of change, & promotes legitimacy $...." HA.

ARTICLE ARGUES THAT FRAGMENTED AND DECENTRALIZED POLICY MAKING STRUCTURES CAN GENERATE MAJOR POLICY INNOVATION AS WELL AS CAN CENTRALIZED STRUCTURES. THE FRAGMENTED COMMITTEE STRUCTURE OF CONGRESS IS SHOWN TO FACILITATE INNOVATION IN THE EXAMPLE OF FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL LEGISLATION.

A simple model of yardstick competition between jurisdictions is presented. Governments of jurisdictions face the alternative to choose between an old and a new policy with stochastic payoffs. The new policy is superior to the old policy in one state of the world, and inferior in the other. Governments are either benevolent, serving the interest of the voter, or rent-seeking. An equilibrium with yardstick competition is shown to exist where bad governments having a good government in their neighborhood choose the new policy more often compared to an equilibrium without relative performance evaluation. Overall, the probability of policy innovations is increased by yardstick competition. The model has a testable empirical implication saying that policy innovations should show spatial correlation.

A simple model of yardstick competition between jurisdictions is presented. Governments of jurisdictions face the alternative to choose between an old and a new policy with stochastic payoffs. The new policy is superior to the old policy in one state of the world, and inferior in the other. Governments are either benevolent, serving the interest of the voter, or rent-seeking. An equilibrium with yardstick competition is shown to exist where bad governments having a good government in their neighborhood choose the new policy more often compared to an equilibrium without relative performance evaluation. Overall, the probability of policy innovations is increased by yardstick competition. The model has a testable empirical implication saying that policy innovations should show spatial correlation.